

Intelligent OFDM telecommunication system. Part 3. Anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming properties of system, based on many-parameter wavelet transforms

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Abstract. In this paper, we aim to investigate the superiority and practicability of many-parameter wavelet transforms (MPWT) from the physical layer security (PHY-LS) perspective. We propose novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication system (Intelligent-OFDM-TCS), based on many-parameter wavelet transform (MPWT). New system uses inverse MPWT for modulation at the transmitter and direct MPWT for demodulation at the receiver. The purpose of employing the MPTs is to improve the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming communication. Each MPWT depends on finite set of independent Jacobi parameters (angles), which could be changed independently one of another. When parameters are changed, multi-parametric transform is changed too taking form of a set known (and unknown) orthogonal (or unitary) wavelet transforms.

We implement the following performances as bit error rate (BER), symbol error rate (SER), peak to average power ratio (PAPR), the Shannon-Wyner secrecy capacity (SWSC) for novel Intelligent-MPWT-OFDM-TCS. Previous research has shown that the conventional OFDM TCS based on discrete Fourier transform (DFT) has unsatisfactory characteristics in BER, PARP, SWSC and in anti-eavesdropping communications. We study Intelligent-MPWT-OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of angle parameters of MPWT optimized BER, PAPR, SWSC, anti-eavesdropping effects. Simulation results show that the proposed Intelligent OFDM-TCS have better performances than the conventional OFDM system based on DFT against eavesdropping.

1. Introduction

Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) has been widely employed in modern wireless communications networks. Unfortunately, conventional OFDM signals are vulnerable to malicious eavesdropping and jamming attacks due to their distinct time and frequency characteristics. The communication that happens between the two legitimate agents needs to be authorized, authentic and secured. Hence, in order to design a secured communication, we need a secret key that can be used to encode the data in order to be prevented from phishing. So, there is a need to generate a secret key with the existing information available. This key should not be shared as the wireless channel remains vulnerable to attack. So, the key should be generated by both the communicating legitimate agents. Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms/protocols implemented at upper layers of the open systems interconnection (OSI) protocol stack, have been widely used to prevent information disclosure to

unauthorized users. However it has its own demerits. To overcome its issues we can use key generation techniques based on many-parameter wavelet transform (MPWT) instead of discrete Fourier transform (DFT) in OFDM communications.

In this paper, we propose a simple and effective anti-eavesdropping Intelligent OFDM system, based on MPWT $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ [1]-[2]. MPWT has the form of the product of the sparse Jacobi rotation matrixes and it describes fast algorithms for MPWT. The purposes of employing the MPWT:

- is to study the influence of parameters $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q$ on the transmission performances of OFDM-TCS,
- is to improve the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming and anti-eavesdropping communication.
- is to minimize the peak to average power ratio (**PAPR**), the bit error rate (**BER**) and symbol error rate (**SER**) performances with respect to the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on fast Fourier transform (FFT),

Each MPWT $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ depends on finite set of independent Krylov-Jacobi (or Euler-Jacobi) parameters (angles $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q$), which could be changed independently one of another. When parameters are changed, sub-carriers, corresponding to multi-parametric transform, are changed too taking form of all known (and unknown) orthogonal sub-carriers that transmit useful information. For this reason, the concrete values of parameters $\varphi_1 = \varphi_1^0, \varphi_2 = \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q = \varphi_q^0$ are specific “key” for entry into OFDM-TCS. Vector $(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ of parameters belong to q -D torus space $[0, 2\pi)^q$. For $(2^n \times 2^n)$ -MPT $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ q is equal to $O(n2^{n-1})$. If, for example, $n = 10$ ($2^{10} = 1024$), then the torus $[0, 2\pi)^q$ will have dimension $10 \cdot 2^9 = 5120$ (it is not 1-D radio frequency axis in the Fourier analyses!). Scanning of the space $[0, 2\pi)^{5120}$ for find out the “key” (the concrete values of parameters $\varphi_1 = \varphi_1^0, \varphi_2 = \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q = \varphi_q^0$) is a hard problem. The process of generating a “key” (parameters) of MPWT can be more efficient in terms of providing security as compared to RSS based technique. This technique generates the “key” in periodical manner (known legitimate communication agents) thereby preventing the attacker (eavesdropper and jammer).

Our network model protector consists of a legitimate transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob). Suppressor is an adversary attacker (Eve). Eva is always in line of sight of both Alice and Bob. Aim of the attackers are to eavesdrop (Eve) legitimate packets sent between Alice and Bob when required. We intend to demonstrate the network performance of Intelligent-OFDM-TCS based on MPT $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ under eavesdropping attack, which are constituted by Eve.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we propose effective $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ -based defense mechanisms to counteract eavesdropping attack in the electronic warfare (EW), in next two sections we study Intelligent $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q)$ -OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of parameters optimized PARP, BER, SER, anti-eavesdropping (section 3).

2. Many-parameter wavelet transforms

2.1. The system model

The system model that is going to be used in this work is know as the wiretap channel model, which was introduced by Schannon [3] and Wyner [4]. It is presented in Fig.1. This model is composed of two legitimate users, named Alice and Bob, while the passive an eavesdropper named Eve attempts to eavesdrop the information. A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob), while Eve is trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. We suppose that the eavesdropper knows frame of OFDM signal of the legitimate Intel-OFDM-TCS (knows

$WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ with initial values of parameters $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ at the time t_0) and has the capability to demodulate OFDM signals. Hence, the legitimate transmitter/receiver (Alice/Bob) and eavesdropper (Eva) use identical parameters of Intel-OFDM-TCS which remain constant over several time slots.

Alice transmits her data using OFDM with N sub-carriers $\{Subc_k(n | \varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)\}_{k=0}^{N-1}$, i.e. she use the MPWT $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ with fixed parameters $\varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0$. When sub-carriers $\{Subc_k(n | \varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)\}_{k=0}^{N-1}$ (i.e. unitary transform $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ of Alice's and Bob's Intelligent-OFDM-TCS are identified by Eva this TCS can be eavesdropped by means of radio-electronic eavesdropping attack.

In this scenario, Bob and Eve will have the same instruments to decode the received message. Therefore, the signals received by Bob and Eva are given by

$$\left| \mathbf{r}_{(B,E|\xi)}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle = \left| \mathbf{s}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + |\xi\rangle = WT_{2^n}^{-1}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + |\xi\rangle,$$

and then process they by $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ -transform

$$\left| \mathbf{R}_{(B,E|\xi)}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle = WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \left| \mathbf{r}_{(B,E|\xi)}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle = \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \right\rangle,$$

where $\left| \Xi(\varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \right\rangle = WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) |\xi\rangle$, $\xi_0, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_{N-1} \in \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma^2)$ is thermal noise, which is modeled as a discrete-time additive complex white Gaussian process (ACWGNP) with a zero mean and σ_{jam}^2 variance. This means that Eve intercepts Alice's message successful.




Figure 1. Eavesdropping attack.

As an anti-eavesdropping measure Alice and Bob can use the following strategy: they select new sub-carriers in Intelligent-OFDM-TCS by changing parameters of $WT_{2^n}^{-1}(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ in the periodical (or pseudo random) manner (a priori known for Alice and Bob)

$$(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \rightarrow (\varphi_1^{rT}, \varphi_2^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}) = (\varphi_1^0 + \Delta\varphi_1^{rT}, \varphi_2^0 + \Delta\varphi_2^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^0 + \Delta\varphi_q^{rT}),$$

$r=0,1,2,\dots$, where $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ are initial values of parameters at the initial time t_0 , T is the period of changing parameters.

If eavesdropping attack is happened on r^* -th period (r^* -th time slot) then in next periods $r > r^*$ the signals received by Bob and Eva are given by

$$\left| \mathbf{r}_{(B,E|\xi)}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle = \left| \mathbf{s}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + |\xi\rangle = WT_{2^n}^{-1}(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}) \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + |\xi\rangle.$$

But they are processed by different MPTs: by MPT $WT_{2^n}^{(r)} = WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})$ (Bob) and by MPT $WT_{2^n}^{(r^*)} = WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T})$ (Eve), i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \mathbf{R}_{(B|\xi)}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle &= WT_{2^n}^{(r)} \left| \mathbf{r}_{(B,E|\xi)}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle = WT_{2^n}^{(r)} \left[\left(WT_{2^n}^{(r)} \right)^{-1} \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + |\xi\rangle \right] = \\ &= \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + WT_{2^n}^{(r)} |\xi\rangle = \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(B_A^{[I]})} \right\rangle + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}) \right\rangle, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \mathbf{R}_{(\mathbf{E}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle &= \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*)} \left| \mathbf{R}_{(\mathbf{B}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle = \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*)} \left[\left(\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*)} \right)^{-1} \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle + |\xi\rangle \right] = \\ &= \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*)} \cdot \left(\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r)} \right)^{-1} \cdot \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle + \mathbf{U}_N^{(r^*)} \cdot |\xi\rangle = \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*,r)} \cdot \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle = \\ &= \left| \mathbf{Z}_E^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle &= \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r)} (\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \cdot |\xi\rangle, \quad \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle = \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*)} (\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \cdot |\xi\rangle, \\ \mathbf{Z}_E^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} &= \mathbf{U}_N^{(r^*,r)} \cdot \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle, \quad \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*,r)} = \text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*)} \cdot \left(\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r)} \right)^{-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Both Bob and Eva give the following estimations

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_{(\mathbf{B}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle &= \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{R}_{(\mathbf{B}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right] = \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle \right], \\ \left| \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_{(\mathbf{E}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle &= \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{R}_{(\mathbf{E}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right] = \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{Z}_E^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle \right] = \\ &= \text{MLA} \left[\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*,r)} \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle + \left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle \right] \end{aligned}$$

using the maximum-likelihood algorithm (MLA). In thermal noiseless case (*i.e.*, $\left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle = 0$ and $\left| \Xi(\varphi_1^{r^*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r^*T}) \right\rangle = 0$), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_B^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle &= \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right] \equiv \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})}, \\ \left| \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_E^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle &= \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{Z}_E^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right] = \text{MLA} \left[\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*,r)} \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle \right] \neq \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})}. \end{aligned}$$

Bob's and Eva's estimations of bit streams are given by the following algorithm

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{(\mathbf{B},\mathbf{A}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} [L] \right\rangle &= \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \left| \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_{(\mathbf{B}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle \right\} = \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} + \left| \Xi^l \right\rangle \right] \right\} \\ \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{(\mathbf{E},\mathbf{A}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} [L] \right\rangle &= \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \left| \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_{(\mathbf{E}|\xi)}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle \right\} = \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \text{MLA} \left[\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*,r)} \cdot \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle + \left| \Xi^l \right\rangle \right] \right\} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\mathbf{B},\mathbf{A}} [L] \right\rangle &= \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \text{MLA} \left[\mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right] \right\} = \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\} \equiv \left| \mathbf{B}_A [L] \right\rangle, \\ \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\mathbf{E},\mathbf{A}} [L] \right\rangle &= \mathbf{C}\mathbf{M}^{-1} \left\{ \text{MLA} \left[\text{WT}_{2^n}^{(r^*,r)} \cdot \left| \mathbf{Z}^{(\mathbf{B}_A^{[L]})} \right\rangle \right] \right\} \neq \left| \mathbf{B}_A [L] \right\rangle = \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B [L] \right\rangle \end{aligned}$$

if noise is missing. We see that Alice&Bob's anti-eavesdropping measure is successful, since

$$\left(\left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{(\mathbf{E},\mathbf{A}|\xi)} [L] \right\rangle \neq \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{(\mathbf{B},\mathbf{A}|\xi)} [L] \right\rangle \right) \& \left(\left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{(\mathbf{B},\mathbf{A}|\xi)} [L] \right\rangle \equiv \left| \mathbf{B}_A [L] \right\rangle \right)$$

with noise and

$$\left(\left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\mathbf{E},\mathbf{A}} [L] \right\rangle \neq \left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\mathbf{B},\mathbf{A}} [L] \right\rangle \right) \& \left(\left| \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\mathbf{B},\mathbf{A}} [L] \right\rangle \equiv \left| \mathbf{B}_A [L] \right\rangle \right),$$

in noiseless case.

The works by Schannon [3] and by Wyner [4] introduced the concept of “secrecy capacity” as a metric for physical layer security. This metric for the l^{th} time-slot can be formulated as shown in the following equation $\mathbf{C}_{(\text{Sec}|\xi)} [L] = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)} [L] - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)} [L]$,

where $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)} [L] = \sum_{r=0}^{dN_s-1} \left(b_A^r [L] \equiv \hat{b}_{(\mathbf{B}|\xi)}^r [L] \right)$ and $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)} [L] = \sum_{r=0}^{dN_s-1} \left(b_A^r [L] \equiv \hat{b}_{(\mathbf{E}|\xi)}^r [L] \right)$ stand for the mutual information between the sent message and the messages received by Bob and Eve (with noise), respectively. In noiseless case, we have

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\text{Sec})} [L] = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\text{Bob}})} [L] - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E)} [L] = dN_s - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E)} [L],$$

where $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B)} [L] = dN_s \equiv \max \left\{ \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B)} [L] \right\}$ and $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E)} [L] = \sum_{r=0}^{dN_s-1} \left(b_A^r [L] \equiv \hat{b}_E^r [L] \right)$.

Generally speaking, this metric allows knowing the amount of information in the received message by Bob, $|\hat{\mathbf{B}}_B\rangle = |\hat{\mathbf{B}}_B[L]\rangle = (\hat{b}_B^0[L], \dots, \hat{b}_B^r[L], \dots, \hat{b}_B^{dN_s-1}[L])$ coinciding with the amount of information contained in the sent by Alice message $|\mathbf{B}_A\rangle = |\mathbf{B}_A[L]\rangle = (b_A^0[L], \dots, b_A^r[L], \dots, b_A^{dN_s-1}[L])$. We will call this measure the “bit secrecy capacity” and denote as

$$\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit}[L] = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Bit}[L] - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit}[L], \quad (1)$$

where $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Bit}[L] = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}[L]$, and $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit}[L] = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}[L]$. Along with this measure, we introduce the “symbol secrecy capacity”

$$\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym}[L] = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Sym}[L] - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym}[L], \quad (2)$$

where $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Sym}[L] = \sum_{r=0}^{N_s-1} (\hat{\mathbf{b}}_A^r[L] = \hat{\mathbf{b}}_{(B|\xi)}^r[L])$ and $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym}[L] = \sum_{r=0}^{N_s-1} (\hat{\mathbf{b}}_A^r[L] = \hat{\mathbf{b}}_{(E|\xi)}^r[L])$.

Note, that transmit $|\mathbf{B}_A[L]\rangle$ and received $|\hat{\mathbf{B}}_B[L]\rangle, |\hat{\mathbf{B}}_E[L]\rangle$ messages depend on parameters $(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})$ and $(\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})$ of the unitary transforms $\mathbf{U}_N^{-1}(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})$ and $\mathbf{U}_N^{-1}(\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})$, respectively:

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathbf{B}_A[L]\rangle &= |\mathbf{B}_A[L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})]\rangle, \quad |\hat{\mathbf{B}}_B[L]\rangle = |\hat{\mathbf{B}}_B[L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})]\rangle, \\ |\hat{\mathbf{B}}_E[L]\rangle &= |\hat{\mathbf{B}}_E[L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})]\rangle, \end{aligned}$$

Hence, $\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}[L]$ and $\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym}[L]$ depend on the same parameters

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] &= \\ = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Bit} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})] - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] & \\ \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] &= \\ = \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Sym} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})] - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] & \end{aligned}$$

Obviously, in order to have a good quality and secure system it is necessary to maximize the values of $\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{opt } \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit} [L] &= \max_{(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})} \left\{ \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] \right\}, \\ \text{opt } \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym} [L] &= \max_{(\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})} \left\{ \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

The secrecy capacities characterize the maximum rate at which message can be securely delivered. In noiseless case we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{C}_{(Sec)}^{Bit} [L] &= dN_s - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})], \\ \mathbf{C}_{(Sec)}^{Sym} [L] &= N_s - \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym} [L | (\varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_1^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})]. \end{aligned}$$

In this case it is necessary to minimize values of $\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{E_{\text{vir}}})}[L]$:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{opt } \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit} [L] &= \min_{(\varphi_0^{rT}, \varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})} \left\{ \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit} [L | (\varphi_0^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_0^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] \right\}, \\ \text{opt } \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym} [L] &= \min_{(\varphi_0^{rT}, \varphi_1^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT})} \left\{ \text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym} [L | (\varphi_0^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}); (\varphi_0^{r*T}, \dots, \varphi_q^{r*T})] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

It is naturally to introduce normed secrecy capacities

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\mathbf{C}}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit} [L] &= \frac{\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit} [L]}{\max \{ \mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit} [L] \}} = \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Bit} [L]}{dN_s} - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A; \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit} [L]}{dN_s} = \\ &= (1 - \mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi)} [L]) - (1 - \mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi)} [L]) = \mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi)} [L] - \mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi)} [L], \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\mathbf{C}}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym}[L] &= \frac{\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Sym}[L]}{\max\{\mathbf{C}_{(Sec|\xi)}^{Bit}[L]\}} = \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Sym}[L]}{N_s} - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym}[L]}{N_s} = \\ &= (1 - \mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi)}[L]) - (1 - \mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi)}[L]) = \mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi)}[L] - \mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi)}[L], \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where

$$\mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi)}[L] = 1 - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Bit}[L]}{dN_s}, \quad \mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi)}[L] = 1 - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Bit}[L]}{dN_s}, \quad (5)$$

$$\mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi)}[L] = 1 - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi)}^{Sym}[L]}{N_s}, \quad \mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi)}[L] = 1 - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi)}^{Sym}[L]}{N_s}, \quad (6)$$

In noiseless case we have

$$\overline{\mathbf{C}}_{Sec}^{Bit}[L] = \overline{\mathbf{C}}_{(Sec|\xi=0)}^{Bit}[L] = 1 - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi=0)}^{Bit}[L]}{dN_s} = \mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi=0)}[L], \quad (7)$$

$$\overline{\mathbf{C}}_{Sec}^{Sym}[L] = \overline{\mathbf{C}}_{(Sec|\xi=0)}^{Sym}[L] = 1 - \frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_E|\xi=0)}^{Sym}[L]}{N_s} = \mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi=0)}[L], \quad (8)$$

since $\frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi=0)}^{Bit}[L]}{dN_s} = 1$, $\mathbf{BER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi=0)}[L] = 0$ and $\frac{\text{Inf}_{(\mathbf{B}_A, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_B|\xi=0)}^{Sym}[L]}{N_s} = 1$, $\mathbf{SER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi=0)}[L] = 0$.

2.2. Simulation Results

In this subsection, we conduct computer simulations to verify the performances of our Intelligent OFDM-TCS, based on MPTs. Simulations have been done in MATLAB (R2012b) software. In the simulation, the Intelligent OFDM TCS's parameters are assumed as follows: M-QAM modulation, where $M = 2^8 = 256$ ($d = 8$), the length of MPWT (i.e., the number of subcarriers is 256) is $N = 256$, every time-slot (OFDM-symbols) is a row from grey-level (256×256)-image "Lena", the number of time-slot equal to 256 (it is equal to the number of rows of "Lena"). The length of bit-stream of a single time-slot is equal to $8 \times 256 = 2048$. Data of 2048 bits are sent in the form of 256 8-bit symbols (one symbol is of 8 bits). Data are similar between all OFDM TCS, based on MPTs and 6 orthogonal transforms.

Now, we provide some simulation results to substantiate our theoretical claims for MPWT with initial values of parameters $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \varphi_3^0, \varphi_4^0) = (\pi/4, \pi/4, \pi/8, \pi/3)$. If parameters in orthogonal transforms of Alice's and Eva's OFDM-TCS are the same (i.e., Eve knows $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \varphi_3^0, \varphi_4^0)$), then $\mathbf{MSD} = 0$, $\mathbf{BER} = 0$ and $\mathbf{SER} = 0$. This means that Eve successful intercepts Alice's messages. In order to protect corporate privacy and sensitive client information from the threat of electronic eavesdropping Alice and Bob use describe above defense mechanism. They change parameters

$$(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \rightarrow (\varphi_1^{rT}, \varphi_2^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}) = (\varphi_1^0 + \Delta\varphi_1^{rT}, \varphi_2^0 + \Delta\varphi_2^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^0 + \Delta\varphi_q^{rT}), \quad r = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

It would be interesting to know how MSD, BER and SER are changing with respect to deviation $(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4)$ from initial values $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \varphi_3^0, \varphi_4^0)$.

Example. Let Alice's and Bob's Intel-OFDM TCS, based on MPWT has the following initial values

of parameters $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \varphi_3^0, \varphi_4^0) = \left(\frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{8}, \frac{\pi}{3}\right)$. Let Alice's transmitted message will be as:

"The American space agency has released a video describing the perilous journey its InSight probe will make to the surface of Mars later this month. Fronted by Rob Manning, the chief engineer at Nasa's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the film describes the various stages of what is termed "entry, descent and landing", or EDL. It is a sequence of high jeopardy. The agency produced a similar video for its Curiosity Mars lander in 2012 called The 7 Minutes of Terror. That became a viral hit. This one isn't quite so showy but is nonetheless very successful in communicating the drama of a landing on Mars. Launched from Earth back in May, InSight is still (Friday) a couple of million km from the Red Planet.

The arrival time is fixed, says Tom Hoffman, InSight project manager at JPL. "We're going to land on November 26 at about 11:47 Pacific time (19:47 GMT) regardless of anything. That is, we're on a ballistic entry; we can't change it; we can't go back around," he told reporters this week. InSight is a static probe. In other words, it will sit still in one place; it will not rove around the planet like Curiosity and Nasa's other wheeled robots. It will be the first mission to focus its investigations predominantly on the interior of Mars."

If Eve knows these parameters then she receive the same message. Let now Alice sends this message by Intel-OFDM TCS with new parameters $(\varphi_1^1, \varphi_2^1, \varphi_3^1, \varphi_4^1) = (\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0 + \frac{\pi}{20}, \varphi_3^0, \varphi_4^0)$ and Eve receive it by

Intel-OFDM TCS with initial parameters $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \varphi_3^0, \varphi_4^0) = (\frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{8}, \frac{\pi}{3})$. In this case **BER** = 0,0512

and **SER** = 0,4266. It means that almost half (42,66%) of symbols received by Eve are erroneous:

The Fmeri fn v ce'agenc~ o t teleas ' 'vjde de d ibnng he verilot 'journey'it 'InSnwht soce wjl 'make'to {he turffce ofMa late {hi 'mnth. Irrnnte by&Ro 'Manni g,{hkh dhief jnginej' t'N ta 'Jet toqilsio 'L eos {osz, {he film dj drnbe 'the'varmou 'st hes'of'wna{ n 'termek'%ent z, et ent fnd'landinf%, n 'EDM. It'is f teqtjncc'nf nigh'je v rdy. The'aien } wrodu jd'a'simjla 'vi j'fn 'i{ 'Czri sity'Ma lande 'in 5 6l'called {xd ('Mimu'e of'Te os 'Tha'eedame' 'vm al xjt. [hj ' e isn' 'qtite' n shovz eut m 'nnne helet 'verz ttccj fzl in dommuni a ing {he k am of& 'landimw 'm'M ts.'Latnched'fso Jtto d ck'in'Maz,'In nght'i t il /Ftidaz' 'couvle nf mill nn k i nm the''jd'Plame .'The' trivbl tjme i 'fjxed ta' 'Tom Xnffman, NnSiwht vroj 'l'naheu et IPL. \$We'se'wninw'to'land' N'uem j &29 et dott'66:;' eci m 'time .0>94''WMT. teg tT es 'oe anzthi g. [xbr'is, vd'te'nf dalli ic en ry;'wd dam'f chbng 'it; vd dan't h'ac frnund,'"he {o d'rjpnr er 'this yejk. InSifht n ' 's afic vrobj.'In'other yosds, it vill 'it's il in 'ne vlcj;'it will nnt'rnuj eround' ie'qlame{'like'Czrio it 'and'Na e't nth t whdeled tobot . It'wjl ee'th 'fi tt'mi sion tn iocts nts nvet igbtii 'tedolinantl om {he mterio 'f'M t.




Figure 2. $MSD(\varphi_i)$ measurement versus φ_i ($i=1,2,3,4$), where $\Delta\varphi_1 = \Delta\varphi_2 = \Delta\varphi_3 = \Delta\varphi_4 = \pi/10$,
 a) $\varphi_1^0 = \pi/4 \approx 0,785$, b) $\varphi_2^0 = \pi/4 \approx 0,785$, c) $\varphi_3^0 = \pi/8 \approx 0,3927$, d) $\varphi_4^0 = \pi/3 \approx 1,047$. MPWT is $WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4)$.

The transmission performances of OFDM system are evaluated by average **MSD**, **BER** and **SER** measurements under 256 time-slot. Figs. 2-4 show the average the following measurements

$$\overline{\text{MSD}}(\varphi_i) = \frac{1}{256} \sum_{l=0}^{255} \text{MSD}[l | \varphi_i] = \frac{1}{256} \sum_{l=0}^{255} \sqrt{\frac{1}{N_s} \sum_{k=1}^{N_s} |Z_k^{(b^k[l])}(\varphi_i) - \hat{Z}_k^{(b^k[l])}(\varphi_i)|^2},$$

$$\overline{\text{BER}}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi=0)}(\varphi_i) = \sum_{l=0}^{255} \text{BER}_{(A \rightarrow B|\xi=0)}[l | \varphi_i], \quad \overline{\text{SER}}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi=0)}(\varphi_i) = \sum_{l=0}^{255} \text{SER}_{(A \rightarrow E|\xi=0)}[l | \varphi_i]$$

versus φ_i ($i = 1, 2, 3, 4$) in noiseless case. It can be seen that when gradually changing $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4$ the $\overline{\text{MSD}}(\varphi_i)$, $\overline{\text{BER}}(\varphi_i)$ and $\overline{\text{SER}}(\varphi_i)$ decreasing to maximum values in about $\pi/4$ for $\overline{\text{MSD}}(\varphi_i)$, $\overline{\text{BER}}(\varphi_i)$ and in about $\pi/8$ for $\overline{\text{SER}}(\varphi_i)$. When parameters in transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Eva) are the same, we have $\text{MSD} = 0$, $\text{BER} = 0$ and $\text{SER} = 0$. This means that Eve successful intercepts Alice's messages. All graphics have V-like form. It means, that if Alice and Bob change work value of parameters, but Eve use previous value, then Eve will receive Alice's message with big mistakes.




Figure 3. $\overline{\text{BER}}(\varphi_i)$ measurement versus φ_i ($i = 1, 2, 3, 4$), where $\Delta\varphi_1 = \Delta\varphi_2 = \Delta\varphi_3 = \Delta\varphi_4 = \pi/10$,

a) $\varphi_1^0 = \pi/4 \approx 0,785$, b) $\varphi_2^0 = \pi/4 \approx 0,785$, c) $\varphi_3^0 = \pi/8 \approx 0,392$, d) $\varphi_4^0 = \pi/3 \approx 1,047$. MPWT is

$$\text{WT}_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4).$$

Theoretical analysis and simulation results prove that the proposed new system has better anti-eavesdropping performance than the conventional system.

3. Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication systems based on many-parameter transforms (MPTs). The purpose of employing the MPT is to improve: 1) the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming and anti-eavesdropping communication; 2) the bit error rate (BER) performance with respect to the conventional OFDM-TCS; 3) the peak to average power ratio (PAPR). The new systems use inverse MPWT for modulation at the transmitter and direct MPWT for demodulation at the receiver. Each MPT depends on finite set of independent parameters (angles), which could be changed in dependently of one another. When parameters are changed, multi-parametric transform is changed too taking form of a set known (and unknown)

orthogonal (or unitary) transforms. The main advantage of using MPT in OFDM TCS is that it is a very flexible system allowing to construct Intelligent OFDM TCS for electronic warfare (EW). EW consists of suppressor (Eve) and protector (Alice and Bob). Suppressor aims to “reduce the effectiveness” of enemy forces, including command and control and their use of weapons systems, and targets enemy communications and reconnaissance by changing the “quality and speed” of information processes. In reverse, EW in defense (Alice&Bob) protects such assets and those of friendly forces.




Figure 4. $SER(\varphi_i)$ measurement versus φ_i ($i=1,2,3,4$), where $\Delta\varphi_1 = \Delta\varphi_2 = \Delta\varphi_3 = \Delta\varphi_4 = \pi / 10$,
 a) $\varphi_1^0 = \pi / 4 \approx 0,785$, b) $\varphi_2^0 = \pi / 4 \approx 0,785$, c) $\varphi_3^0 = \pi / 8 \approx 0,392$, d) $\varphi_4^0 = \pi / 3 \approx 1,047$. MPT is

$$U_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_q) = WT_{2^n}(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4).$$

A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob), while Eve will be trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. Alice transmits her data using OFDM with N many-parameter wavelet sub-carriers $\{Subc_k(n | \varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)\}_{k=0}^{N-1}$, i.e. she use the unitary transform $WT_N(\varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ with fixed parameters $\varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0$. When sub-carriers $\{Subc_k(n | \varphi_1^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)\}_{k=0}^{N-1}$ of Alice’s and Bob’s Intelligent-OFDM-TCS are identified by Eve this TCS can be eavesdropped by means of radio-electronic eavesdropping attack.). As an anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming measures, Alice and Bob can use the following strategy: they can select new sub-carriers by changing parameters in $WT_N(\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_q)$ in the periodical (or in pseudo random) manner

$$(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0) \rightarrow (\varphi_1^{rT}, \varphi_2^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^{rT}) = (\varphi_1^0 + \Delta\varphi_1^{rT}, \varphi_2^0 + \Delta\varphi_2^{rT}, \dots, \varphi_q^0 + \Delta\varphi_q^{rT}), r = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

where $(\varphi_1^0, \varphi_2^0, \dots, \varphi_q^0)$ are initial values of parameters at the initial time t_0 , T is the period of changing parameters. Theoretical analysis and simulation results prove that the proposed new system has better anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performances than the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on DFT.

4. References

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